期末练习|C 长题
期末自拟练习,英文题干,逐题折叠中文解析、英文参考答案与课件页码。
手机上宽表格可左右滑动;自测答案默认收起,点击题目下方按钮查看。
使用边界:期末自拟练习,非官方材料。没有往年期末卷可对照,题型、分值和时长只是练习安排;正式范围、题型、时长和开闭卷要求以讲师通知为准。题干全部自拟;课件与官方文档说法不同时按课件作答,并在解析里注明差异。
复习资料:范围与以太坊、Solidity 要点 · Fabric 与选型要点 · 必背与闪卡
统一约定:Solidity 为 0.8.x,默认检查算术溢出;Fabric 题按课件的读写集与版本模型。页码一律用 PDF 页序。
练习安排:4 题共 50 分,建议 60 分钟。
自查分值仅供练习,不代表教师评分标准;先作答,再展开每题答案。
来源代号:L02 = Lecture2.pdf;L03 = Lecture3.pdf;L04b = Lecture 4.1.pdf;L05 = Lecture 5.pdf;L06 = Lecture 6 - v3.pdf;L07 = Lecture 7.pdf;L08 = Lecture 8.pdf。来源为对应逐讲注解。
C · 长题
共 50 分。先写结论再展开;Fabric 题画出版本变化。
C1 · Complete a Solidity contract · 12 marks
A club keeps a shared fund. Members deposit ether; only the treasurer can pay it out. Fill in blanks (1)–(6).
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
contract ClubFund {
/* (1) declare the treasurer address, readable by anyone */
mapping(address => uint256) public deposits;
error NotTreasurer(address caller);
event Deposited(address indexed member, uint256 amount);
event Paid(address indexed to, uint256 amount);
constructor() {
/* (2) the deployer becomes treasurer */
}
modifier onlyTreasurer() {
/* (3) reject other callers with the custom error, then continue */
}
function deposit() external /* (4) */ {
require(msg.value > 0, "zero deposit");
/* (5) record the deposit and log it */
}
function pay(address payable to, uint256 amount) external onlyTreasurer {
require(amount <= address(this).balance, "insufficient balance");
/* (6) send amount to `to` with call, and stop if it fails */
emit Paid(to, amount);
}
receive() external payable {
deposits[msg.sender] += msg.value;
emit Deposited(msg.sender, msg.value);
}
}
- Blank (1). (1)
- Blank (2). (1)
- Blank (3). (2)
- Blank (4), and what happens without it. (2)
- Blank (5). (2)
- Blank (6), and why the return value matters. (2)
- Bob, who is not the treasurer, calls
pay. What happens to state and to the ether? Why is a custom error preferred over a longrequirestring? (2)
C1 · 查看答案与解析
推理过程:逐空对应课件语法点。(1) 状态变量要 public 才自动生成 getter。(2) 构造器只运行一次,部署者就是 msg.sender。(3) 修饰器里先检查,_; 代表被修饰函数体。(4) 不加 payable 的函数拒收 ether,带 value 的调用整体回退。(5) 记账加 emit 事件,DApp 才能监听到存款。(6) 推荐用 call 转账,它失败时只返回 false、不自动回滚,所以必须检查返回值。(7) Bob 调用时修饰器 revert:本次调用的状态全部回滚,ether 不动,已消耗的 gas 不退。custom error 比长 require 字符串省 gas,还能带参数。
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
contract ClubFund {
address public treasurer; // (1)
mapping(address => uint256) public deposits;
error NotTreasurer(address caller);
event Deposited(address indexed member, uint256 amount);
event Paid(address indexed to, uint256 amount);
constructor() {
treasurer = msg.sender; // (2)
}
modifier onlyTreasurer() {
if (msg.sender != treasurer) revert NotTreasurer(msg.sender); // (3)
_;
}
function deposit() external payable { // (4)
require(msg.value > 0, "zero deposit");
deposits[msg.sender] += msg.value; // (5)
emit Deposited(msg.sender, msg.value);
}
function pay(address payable to, uint256 amount) external onlyTreasurer {
require(amount <= address(this).balance, "insufficient balance");
(bool ok, ) = to.call{value: amount}(""); // (6)
require(ok, "transfer failed");
emit Paid(to, amount);
}
receive() external payable {
deposits[msg.sender] += msg.value;
emit Deposited(msg.sender, msg.value);
}
}
English: payable lets a function receive ether. A low-level call returns a success flag that must be checked. A revert undoes all state changes of the call. Custom errors are cheaper than revert strings and can carry parameters.
自查分值:按题面分值;第 (3) 空缺 _; 扣 1 分。回查:L04b p.9–10、p.26、p.29–34、p.43–44、p.55–62、p.73。
C2 · A Fabric transaction from proposal to commit · 12 marks
Channel trade has peers of Org1, Org2 and Org3. An asset-transfer chaincode is installed on the peers of Org1 and Org2 only. The endorsement policy is AND('Org1MSP.peer','Org2MSP.peer'). A client application of Org1 submits TransferAsset(asset7, Bob).
- Describe the five steps from proposal to commit, naming the component that acts in each step. (5)
- State two things the ordering service does and two things it does not do, according to the slides. (2)
- The chaincode reads the local clock, so Org2’s peer returns a different write value from Org1’s peer. What happens? Would a single-endorser policy change the outcome? (2)
- How can Org3’s peer validate and commit this transaction without the chaincode installed? (2)
- How does the client application learn that the transaction has been committed? (1)
C2 · 查看答案与解析
推理过程:按「谁签、谁算、谁排、谁验」四个角色走一遍。
- Proposal:Org1 的客户端构造提案(链码名、函数、参数),用自己的身份签名,发给 Org1 和 Org2 的背书 peer。
- Endorse:背书 peer 检查客户端签名,在本地世界状态上模拟执行,不改账本,生成读写集并签名返回。
- Submit:客户端核对两份结果一致、满足 AND 策略,把提案、读写集和背书打包成交易,提交给排序服务。
- Order:排序服务把所有客户端的交易排成全序,切块,分发给通道里所有 peer,包括 Org3。
- Validate and commit:每个 peer 对每笔交易做背书策略检查和版本检查,标记 valid/invalid,把区块追加到区块链,只把有效交易的写集应用到世界状态。
第 2 问:排序服务做全序、打包、分发;不执行链码、不检查读写集和背书、不保存世界状态。课件 vs 官方:课件说排序服务 stateless、不检查交易内容;官方文档里它会按通道的写入策略核对提交者身份。
第 3 问:两家结果不同,背书不匹配,凑不出满足 AND 的一致背书,交易不会被提交。若策略只要一个背书方,它的结果被直接采用,因为提交方不重新执行。
第 4 问:验证只需要背书签名、背书策略和读写集版本,不需要重跑链码;Org3 信任背书方的模拟结果。
第 5 问:peer 提交后向客户端发出事件通知。
English: The client signs a proposal; endorsing peers simulate and sign rw-sets; the client submits the endorsed transaction to the orderer; the orderer orders, batches and distributes blocks; every peer checks the endorsement policy and read-set versions, then commits. Peers without the chaincode can still validate.
自查分值:第 1 问每步 1 分,其余按题面。回查:L06 p.49–54、p.56、p.58、p.73、p.86–89。
C3 · Read-write set validation · 14 marks
Versions follow the slides’ counter model: a valid write raises the key’s version by 1, and a new key starts at version 1. Initial world state (key, version, value):
| Key | Version | Value |
|---|---|---|
| k1 | 3 | 100 |
| k2 | 1 | 20 |
| k3 | 2 | 7 |
| k4 | 5 | 40 |
All six transactions were simulated on this initial state and are ordered into one block as T1 → T6.
| Tx | Read set (key, version) | Write set |
|---|---|---|
| T1 | (k1, 3) | k1 → 110 |
| T2 | (k1, 3), (k2, 1) | k2 → 30 |
| T3 | see part 1 | see part 1 |
| T4 | none | k5 → 50 |
| T5 | (k3, 2), (k4, 5) | k4 → 41 |
| T6 | (k4, 5) | delete k2 |
T3’s chaincode runs, in order: PutState(k3, 8), PutState(k3, 9), GetState(k2), GetState(k3).
- Write T3’s read set and write set. What value does the final
GetState(k3)return? (3) - Decide whether each of T1–T6 is valid or invalid, with a reason. (6)
- Give the final world state as (key, version, value). (4)
- Are the invalid transactions recorded in the ledger? (1)
C3 · 查看答案与解析
推理过程:第 1 问:两次 PutState 只保留最后一次,写集是 k3 → 9。课件不支持 read-your-writes,写之后再读 k3 返回已提交的值 7,并把 (k3, 2) 记进读集。T3 读集为 (k2, 1)、(k3, 2)。
第 2 问按区块顺序推,每笔交易拿读集版本和「当时」的世界状态比:
| Tx | 判定 | 原因 | 之后的变化 |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | valid | k1 版本仍是 3 | k1 → (4, 110) |
| T2 | invalid | k1 已被 T1 改成版本 4 | 无 |
| T3 | valid | k2 仍是 1(T2 无效没写成),k3 仍是 2 | k3 → (3, 9) |
| T4 | valid | 没有读集,不可能冲突 | 新键 k5 → (1, 50) |
| T5 | invalid | k3 已被 T3 改成版本 3 | 无,k4 不变 |
| T6 | valid | k4 仍是 5(T5 无效没写成) | 删除 k2 |
第 3 问最终世界状态:(k1, 4, 110)、(k3, 3, 9)、(k4, 5, 40)、(k5, 1, 50);k2 已删除。
第 4 问:T2 和 T5 仍记在区块里,被标为 invalid,只是不改世界状态。
易错点:无效交易的写不算数,所以 T3、T6 不受 T2、T5 影响;同一区块里顺序决定结果。课件 vs 官方:本题版本按课件 +1 计数;真实 Fabric 的版本号是写入该键的 (块号, 交易号),判定逻辑相同。
English: A transaction is valid only if every key in its read set still has the version it read. Valid writes update the world state in block order; invalid transactions stay in the block without changing state. Chaincode does not see its own uncommitted writes.
自查分值:第 1 问 3 分;第 2 问每笔 1 分;第 3 问每个键 1 分;第 4 问 1 分。回查:L06 p.67–72、p.77、p.81–83;L08 p.45 的同类题。
C4 · Choosing a platform · 12 marks
Twelve universities in a region plan a shared system for degree records. Facts:
- Records must be stored and updated (issued, later possibly revoked).
- Every university writes records for its own graduates.
- The universities refuse to hand the registry to any single operator; no always-online third party is acceptable to all of them.
- Only accredited universities may write, and each is identified by a certificate.
- The universities do not fully trust one another’s records, because a writer could backdate or alter an entry.
- Employers in any country must be able to verify a degree without joining the group.
- Walk through the six-question flow, answering each question with a reason, and give the final result. (6)
- A working group scores the ACT-IAC questions as follows. Compute the total and interpret it using the slides. (4)
| Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q5 | Q6 | Q7 | Q8 | Q9 | Q10 | Q11 | Q12 | Q13 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | 3 | 4 | -2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 | -3 | 0 |
- A government launches an always-online national registry that every university and employer trusts. Q12 becomes -5 and Q4 becomes -5. Give the new total and say what the six-question flow now concludes. (2)
C4 · 查看答案与解析
推理过程:第 1 问逐问走:
- Store state? Yes,要保存并更新学位记录。
- Multiple writers? Yes,十二所大学各自写入。
- Always-online TTP? No,没有各方都接受的第三方。
- All writers known? Yes,只有持证书的认证大学能写。
- All writers trusted? No,写入方可能倒签或篡改。
- Public verifiability? Yes,任何国家的雇主都要能验证。
结论:Public Permissioned Blockchain。
第 2 问:正分题合计 5 + 3 + 4 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 3 + 2 = 31,负分题合计 -2 - 3 + 0 = -5,总分 26,落在 21–40。按课件 p.18:可以用区块链支持,但不是压倒性的天然候选,需要更彻底的分析。
第 3 问:Q4 从 -2 变 -5、Q12 从 -3 变 -5,总分 26 - 3 - 2 = 21,仍在 21–40 的下沿。六问流程在第三问就变成 yes,结论改为 Don’t use。两种工具给出的结论可以不同:六问遇到可信第三方直接走到 Don’t use,打分只是把这一条算作几个负分项。课件没有规定两者冲突时听谁的,作答时把两个结论分别写出并各给理由。课件 vs 官方:课件只给 21–40 一个区间,20 分以下与 41 分以上的解读来自 ACT-IAC playbook 补充。
English: Yes, yes, no, yes, no, yes leads to a public permissioned blockchain. An ACT-IAC score between 21 and 40 means blockchain can support the case but is not an overwhelmingly natural fit, so more thorough analysis is needed. An acceptable always-online trusted third party ends the six-question flow with “don’t use a blockchain”.
自查分值:第 1 问每问 1 分;第 2 问总分 2 分、解读 2 分;第 3 问 2 分。回查:L08 p.4–5、p.8–18。
作答后怎么复盘
先对结论,再对推导:代码题逐空核对语法与回滚后果;读写集题重画版本表;选型题把六问和打分各走一遍,说明两者结论为何可能不同。
这组材料已读完,可以回课程页选择配套资料或练习:COMP5565 课程页。
个人整理的学习笔记,不是官方材料;数字与结论以课件和讲师为准。